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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PATRICK SEAN IRVING,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43692
Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-15654

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Irving failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing a unified sentence of 20 years, with 15 years fixed, for one count of first
degree arson, and a consecutive sentence of 20 years indeterminate, for a second
count of first degree arson?

Irving Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Irving pled guilty to two counts of first degree arson and the district court imposed
a unified sentence of 20 years, with 15 years fixed for one count, and a consecutive

1

sentence of 20 years indeterminate for the second count. (R., pp.109-13.) Irving filed a
notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.118-20.)
Irving asserts his sentences are excessive in light of his capability to rehabilitate,
purported remorse, the support of family and friends, and because, he claims, his
actions were due to a mental health situation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-7.) The record
supports the sentence imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for first degree arson is 25 years. I.C. § 18-802.
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 20 years, with 15 years fixed, for one
count, and 20 years indeterminate for the second count, both of which fall well within the
statutory guidelines. (R., pp.109-13.) At sentencing, the district court addressed the
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seriousness of the offenses, the danger Irving presents to the community, and his prior
criminal history. (10/5/15 Tr., p.25, L.1 – p.31, L.12.)

The state submits that Irving has

failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached
excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Irving’s convictions and
sentences.

DATED this 22nd day of April, 2016.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of April, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

STATE OF IDAHO VS. PATRICK SEAN IRVING

CASE NO: CR·FE-2014 -15654

l
All right, Mr. Irving. On yoor plea of guilty,
2 I find you guilty. In an exercise of my discretion In
3 sentencing, I have considered the Toohlll factors,
4 including the nature of the offense and the character of
5 the offender, the lnfonnation in mitigation and In
6 aggravation of the crtme.
In fashioning asentence I am mindful of and
7
8 take Into account the objectives of, first and foremost,
9 protectlng society; also achieving deterrence, the
10 potenHal for rehabilitation and the need for retribution
11 or punishment.
12
I have reviewed the PSI materials, and I've
13 considered them. I've reviewed the psychologkal
14 evaluation that's been done, and I have considered It I
15 have considered the arguments of counsel today. I have
16 considered the victim Impact statements that have been
17 made today. And I have considered your statement that
18 you have made today.
19
I have considered also, as is required of me,
20 the factors outlined In 19·2523. In partieular, I have
21 considered the extent to whldl the defendant IS mentally
22 Ill. I have considered the d~ee <i lllness and the
23 impairment that it has given Im or has restricted his
24 functional abilities.
I have considered the prognoSls for the
25
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1 potential for Improvement or rehabilitation. I have
2 considered the risk that h:3.resents to the community and
3 to others Whe Is not treat • I have considered the
4 avallablllty of that treatment and the level of care
5 required.
I have, as I indicated, considered and perhaps
6
7 most importantly, the danger that the defendant may
8 create to the publiC, particularly if he Is not medkated
9 appropriately and Is not treated appropriate~.
10
I have considered the capacity the defendant has
11 to arcpredate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to
12 con orm himself to the requirements of lawat the time In
13 partlcular that the conduct in thls case occurred.
I have considered the availability of treatment
14
15 and where that treatment can best be provlded, being
16 whether that can be provided In acom mun~ now or In the
17 future or whether It can be provided to him i
18 Incarcerated.
19
This, dearly, was acrime that Is •• to call It
20 aproperty cnme would be amlSleadlng characterization.
21 This was acrime that was perpetrated on the victims,
22 that struck them literally to where they lived. It
23 struck them In the home that should be asanctuary. It
24 should be arefuge from fear of attack, fear of violence.
25 And did so In away that was particularly Insidious In
26

1 tl1at it was anattack on them and In their home not once
2 but twice.
3
It was an attack that was, at best, acomrnlete
4 disregard for the life and safety of others. I th nk
5 that it was an attack that under any circumstances should
6 have been recognized to have presented arisk of death to
7 lnnocen~eop!e; and that's whether or not the attack was
8 mottvat by mental Illness.
9
Toe reasons for the attack and whether thefc were
10 motiVated by mental Illness does not change the act that
11 the defendant, even in that state of p~choSls( shou!dnt
12 have been able to recognize that the potentla result of
13 that attack could be death or injury to others.
14
Toedefendant eloquently and I think
15 appropriate~ today stated his remorse for the attack.
16 And from what I can tell from the mateoa~ that seems
17 to be genuine. And I hope that does prov! esome degree
18 of relief and dosure to the victims.
19
But the defendant himself is not - this is not
20 asingle Isolated incident of aim!nal conduct. The
21 defendant has ahistory of almlnal conduct of,
22 effectlvely, being adru& dealer.
That Is not some Ing that Is motiVated or Is
23
24 perpetrated solely because of amental Illness. That Is
25 acalculated dedslOn to go Into the business of selling

1 drugs. It Is acrime that IS not necessarily Slmp~ the
2 product of mental Illness.
3
Toe cone.em the Court has Is that thedefendant,
4 as is recognized In the psychological evaluation,
5 prevents a- or, pardon me •• presents avery
6 s~nifkant risk to the community with the potential for
7 serious harm or death to others if he is in the community
8 and not medicated.
There's aamcem that the defendant has
9
10 demonstrated ahlsto~ of not being compliant with
11 treatment recommen attons, being compliant with his
12 medlcaHon requirements.
The Court's primary consideration above all
13
14 others is the protection of thecommunity. ThisIs
15 dearly aaime that requires asignificant penalty, but
16 It also needs to be structured In away that it protects
17 not only these victims spedflcally but protects other
18 members of the community from future acts of Violence of
19 this type; that protects the defendant, should he be In
20 the commun~ and be unsupel\llsed or even if supervised,
21 go off his m kations or elect to go off his
22 medications, because we have seen what that can produce.
23
I don~ doubt that the defendan~ when
24 appr~rlately treated, a- can be ag person. I'm
25 sure at he is aloving son. And I know that this is a
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STATE OF IDAHO VS. PATRICK SEAN IRVI NG
1 difficult thing for himand for hisfamily. And rdon1
2 mean tomiss the fact that those are other victims In
3 this, hisfamily, because it truly has an Impact on them
4 as well,
5
Given the damer the defendant presents, given
6 the seriousness of Is cnme~e potential for death or
7 serious Injury and the other ors that I\te outlined,
8 but also In considering the mitigatingfactors, some of
9 which I have outlined, lndudlng other mitigating factors
10 I haven1 mentioned and, frank~, rdon~ have time to
11 mention au of themffibut I\te consklered them; some of
12 them lndude the di cult circumstances that he had
13 growingup, obv10u~ hismental illness, his substance
14 abuse, this Court beUeves that a lengthy penal
15 lncarceratiOn Is aJipropriate and necessary.
16
And, acco~ Ing~, Mr. Irving, I sentence you to
17 the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections under
18 the unified sentencing laws of the state of Idaho on
19 Count I for anaggregate teim of 20 years. Court
20 specifies aminimum perlod of confinement of 15~rs
21 fixed followed by a subsequent Indeterminate pe of
22 custody of fiveyears.
23
On Count In, the Court specifies a minimum
24 period of confinement of zero years fixed and a
25 subsequent Indeterminate period of custody of 20 years,
29
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1 for a total sentence of 15 years flxed followed by 25
years Indeterminate, or for atotal of 15 fixed •· a
sentence of 40 years with 15years fixed.
That lengthy period of Indeterminate time, Inmy
view, is necessa,y to ensure that the defendant Is, when
released from custody, safe because he's beinr
7 supelVised, effective~ for the better portion o his
8 life.
9
And I hope genuine~ that the defendant Is able
10 to potentiallyhave an opportunity for release and that
11 he Isableto take h~ medications; that he is able to,
12 Inasafe w~, have ameaningful life when hehas and if
13 he is parol .
14
I remand you, Mr. Irvin~, to the OJstody of the
15 sheriff of the county to be de lvered to the proper agent
16 of the board of correction Inexecution of thissentence.
17 Ball ls exonerated. Credit will be given for 34? days
18 servedJrtor to entry of judgment.
19
ese sentences, Count I and m, shall be
20 served cxmseartlve to one another.
21
It's further ordered that the defendant pmvlde
22 aDNA sample and lht thumb prtnt Impression and
23 otherw~ romply w· the ONA Database Act.
24
I'll order rourt rosts. rm not going to order
25 aflne or public defender reimbursement. I am going to
30
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6

order therestitutlOn that'sbeen requested because that
Is the damage that has been Inflicted on afinancial
basis. Obviously It's not reflected as Ms. Jones
appropriately pointed out It's r~ctlve of the damage
in general that has been Inflicted, but of the economic
damage1that Is what - the damage that has been done.
I aon1t know that It wlll ever be able to be
collected from the defendant, but I think It Is
appropriate that I order It. So rmgotng to order
restitution Inthe amount of $262,077.07,
I didsign the no contact order for aperiod
of ·· for the duration of the sentence of 40 years.
Mr. Irving, you have the right to appeal. If
you cannot afford an attorney, you can request to have
one appointed at publicexpense. MY appeal must be
flied within 42days of thedate of today's order or the
entry of the written order of judgment of conviction
order Imposing your sentence and eootmltment. Mr. Irving,
good luck to you, sir.
MR. BLEAZARD: Your Honor, I'm returning the
State'scopy of the PSI.
(End of proceedings.)
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